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Introduction
Invoking the issue of rationality in economics is
just about as intellectually unique, novel and
exciting as an attempt to discover the real
message of Keynes’s General Theory. For
many economists, and – frankly – one cannot
blame them, the rationality assumption is a trite
question that warrants almost no attention. To
compensate for that, one cannot help but to use
a pretentious title.
In the following text, I acknowledge the impor-
tance of rationality assumption for any economic
theorizing, but propose that economists, in an
attempt at explaining a seemingly irrational
behavior in rational terms, are often engaging
in a scientifically not very useful logical exercise.
I follow some typical examples of such solutions
and present a micro-survey to illustrate their
possible inapplicability. I then argue that this
state of affairs is caused by, and further contributes
to, a neglect of the possibility of irrational
behavior, and conclude by emphasizing the
importance of allowing the possibility of folly.
Lest the purpose of this article be misunder-
stood, it is not concerned with the precise
meaning or content of the rationality assumption
(as e.g. Sen does [15]), neither does it criticize
the employment of such assumption in economic
theorizing. It rather belongs to a tradition of
articles reminding us about deviations of flesh-
and-blood economic agents from the homo
oeconomicus model – a tradition made wide,
long and veritable by Kahneman (see e.g. [9])
and others. My aspiration within this tradition is
modest at best: to point to a possible
methodological slip in the way economist
explicate certain phenomena and the economic
consequences of it.
1. The Rationality Assumption
Economics, it is widely granted, is a science
about the way people make choices and about
consequences of such choices (e.g. [10]). Any
decision, as opposed to non-volitional behavior,
implies a use of reason to juxtapose the pros
and cons of a given route of conduct. This,
however, does not mean that one’s reasoning
must necessarily be at all times correct. The
decision-maker may use all his reason, and yet
his decision may nonetheless turn out wrong –
both ex ante and ex post.
One commonly acknowledged source of
such errors is uncertainty. Due to necessarily
imperfect knowledge of the present and future
states of the world, every decision is based on
expectations and these may prove wrong, thus
making the decision – one that seemed
perfectly correct ex ante – erroneous ex post.
There is, however, a different cause of
error. Even if one correctly perceives both
present and future states of the world (i.e. his
expectation will match reality), a decision can
still be wrong due to the individual being
fundamentally mistaken about the means
proper for the achievement of his ends (i.e.
about causal relations between different
states). His reason may well be telling him that
certain means will lead to the desired ends, and
thus his decision is conscious and thoughtful,
and – no doubt – perceived by the decision-
maker as rational. Yet, he may be mistaken,
confused or simply wrong about a particular
means-ends relationship. This is the kind of
situation that economists have in mind when
they proclaim a behavior irrational – wrong from
the very beginning, even ex ante. And,
perhaps, this is precisely such behavior that
other people would vernacularly call stupid.
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Even though economists recognize the
possibility that people can make errors, most of
them prefer to interpret human behavior in
rational – error-free – terms. There is a very
good reason for doing so. Invoking the possibility
of error is a trivial explanation theoretically
applicable in virtually all cases. It is an anti-
scientific solution, an answer requiring and
producing no useful knowledge whatsoever. To
any question, “Why is he doing that?”, the
universally correct answer may be that “He is
just being stupid!”
The idea of rationality is then an overly
important one for economics, at least for its
main stream. Not because economists could
not fathom an irrational decision, but because it
is a starting point for what economists do:
adding to trivial explanations of phenomena
some non-trivial ones. Thus, without the
concept of rationality there would be no science
of economics.
On the other hand, it would be mistaken to
suppose that economics is applicable only to
situations where people do indeed act rationally,
while having nothing to say about cases of
people acting erroneously. First, thanks to
economics, we are often able to suggest
something about the rationality of the choice in
the first place: without economics we would not
be able to tell a rational from an irrational one.
This is what economists do when they claim
that A is not a means that leads to the
achievement of the end B. Second, economics
being the science about consequences of
human decisions, it can point out consequences
of irrational behavior too. It can claim not only
that A does not lead to B, but that in fact it leads
to C. And that too is a useful knowledge.
Therefore, the presence of irrationality in
human decision making does not strip economics
of its usefulness and importance. The
rationality assumption only enables economists
to say much more than they would be able to
without it.
2. The Quest for Rational
Interpretation: Rational Riddles
Attempts to find rational explanation for human
behavior have long been part of good
economics and the provided explanations are
arguably one of the most impressive kinds of
economics’ output for laymen and the most
enjoyable ones to economists themselves. In
the absence of a straightforward maximizing
explanation, one can talk about rational riddles,
a term coined by Landsburg [10, chapter 2].
However, in this quest for rational
explanations, some economists seem to go as
far as to implicitly assume that there must be
a rational explanation of every human behavior
we observe and they devote great time and
energy towards discovering it. In this way, an
economic, or rational, riddle was born and it
remains to be economists’ pastime agenda –
something to talk about even when they get
tired of working on their regressions or of
calibrating their models.
The rational riddles research program is
fascinating in more aspects than just in its
sophistication and inventiveness. I want to
point out two of them that relate to the scientific
value of the solution and its availability and
testability.
2.1 Value of Solution
The solution to a rational riddle has a peculiar
status among answers that economic science
can offer. Ironically, despite all the impeccable
economic logic of these solutions, they are not
likely to be very valuable for understanding how
our world works. This is because each and
every such solution (assuming it is formally
correct) can turn out to be empirically either
correct or incorrect.
If the solution is correct it means people
whose behavior was examined by economists
indeed do behave the way economists
hypothesized. This may appear as a great
achievement. In a way, it is and it surely
demonstrates the ingeniousness and intuition
of the economist who made that discovery. But
that discovery is certainly not as new as one
would assume real discovery to be. And this is
because, as follows from the premise that it is
empirically correct solution to the riddle, the
economic logic of that behavior (as a profit-
maximizing strategy) must have been known all
along to those who have behaved like that and
whose behavior only caught attention of
a curious economist. (It should be clear that if
agents were ignorant of the logic, it could not
then be claimed that they are acting according
to it.) The practical usefulness of such solution
then may not extend much beyond economists’
mental training or a signal of an economist’s
capability.
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On the other hand, if the proposed solution
is not empirically correct, it means that people
do not behave the way they do for the reason
economists propose. Despite being empirically
inapplicable its usefulness may be just about
the same as the usefulness of the correct
solutions (logical exercise and brain-teasing).
Either way, empirically correct but not new,
or just empirically incorrect, the same conclusion
applies: what these economists produce is an
intellectual feat that adds very little to the
knowledge about how real-world people
behave. (There is one important way in which
this conclusion may be subverted: if economists
– instead of asking why people do what they do
– accepted from the very beginning that people
may act on irrational beliefs about means and
undertook to explain why people’s behavior still
survives. In this setup, economists might
indeed discover how people’s behavior is in fact
effective in bringing about the desired end,
even if people are unaware of it. People may of
course imitate behavior they found successful
without knowing why it works, or, more often,
may have erroneous beliefs about why it works.
Evolution – the natural selection (survival) on
the market – will promote those who imitate
such behavior and punish those who deviate
from it [1, pp. 217–220], and economists may in
such cases make truly valuable contribution by
explaining why the mechanism really works.)
2.2 Availability of a Solution
Another peculiar feature of a rational riddle
solution is the relative ease with which it can be
verified, tested and even discovered in the first
place.
When tackling the riddles economists are
trying to discover the strategy of some decision-
makers. When they produce a solution, when
they think they did puzzle out the alleged
paradox, one would expect them to double-
check that hypothesis with the decision-makers
to acknowledge its correctness. If empirically
correct, they would receive an affirmative
answer (something like “yes, you have guessed
it!”-type of a response), if not they would go
ahead guessing.
After all, asking the very people whose
behavior is the subject of examination whether
the explanation for their behavior is correct, is
surely the easiest way to find out just how
relevant and applicable that explanation is. Yet,
the economists do not seem to be much
interested in taking that step. Instead, they
submit the explanation as independent from
what the decision-makers think and many of
those alleged paradoxes are considered by
economists as unresolved and waiting for still
more ingenious solution. This is roughly what
Deirdre McCloskey calls “Samuelsonian Vice”
[13, pp. 63–69].
In fact, as was pointed out above, as long
as the riddles have rational solutions, there is
no reason to rely on economic scientists to
come up with them, no matter how tricky and
ingenious it may be. It must already exist in the
heads of those rational decision-makers
themselves – they are behaving in this way
now. If economists have hard times revealing
what it is or keep arguing about merits of their
respective explanations, all they would need to
do to settle the argument is to ask the people
who do know.
This is a fundamentally different scientific
problem than the one tackled by natural
scientists. They never enjoy the possibility of
actually asking the subjects of their inquiry
about why they behave the way they do.
Economists, on the other hand, avid to
understand people’s behavior, almost always
could. Trying to discover the answer prior to,
and independently of, asking the people whose
behavior economists study could certainly
constitute an interesting discipline in a “best
economist contest”, but may fail to contribute
much to understanding the true reality. (It is true
that people may not always speak truth, and
may even be motivated not to reveal the truth to
protect their business technology. The pheno-
mena described as rational riddles are so
widespread though that it would be fantastic to
assume that an attempt of all its practitioners to
keep it secret would ever work, much less for
so long. Unbelievable as it is, it is precisely this
scenario that is implied by the economists’
neglect of contrasting their ideas to what
people say.)
3. Riddles Solved
To illustrate and substantiate such claims I think
it necessary to support it by looking at some
rational explanations of seemingly irrational
behavior. I have chosen three popular economic
riddles and roughly mapped the solutions to
them suggested in economic literature.
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All cases have to do with pricing. This is
because there is a common prejudice that as
business decisions they are most likely to be
undertaken rationally as a means to profit
maximization. Therefore they constitute cases
where it makes the best sense on the part of
economists to search for rational explanations.
3.1 Popcorn Overpricing
Some economists keep being intrigued by the
fact that popcorn costs allegedly too much in
movie theatres. This is because the profit
maximization strategy in this situation would
under conventional assumptions entail just
marginal cost pricing for popcorn combined
with an accordingly higher entrance fee. (The
conventional assumptions include e.g. identical
costumers’ preferences [11, p. 369].) The
authors then look for reasons why selling
popcorn so dear actually secures higher profits
than marginal cost pricing of the conventional
theory.
All explanations of this deviation from the
expected behavior revolve round price
discrimination. They argue there is a positive
correlation between preference for popcorn
and willingness to pay for the entertainment in
the theater (i.e. for the bundle of watching the
movies and consumption of snacks from
concession stands). Examples of such
reasoning are provided by e. g. Friedman 
[6, pp. 51–53] or Landsburg [10, pp. 159–161].
In order to charge more to those who value
coming to the theatre more, it is found natural
that price of popcorn (soda or other snacks) will
be raised above marginal cost while the
entrance fee lowered in order to attract those,
who would not otherwise come. (More formal
analysis is provided by Luis Locay and Alvaro
Rodriguez [12, pp. 959–960].) Thus, the
puzzling high price of popcorn is after all
a rational profit-maximization.
The one explanation the authors expressly
deny happens to be the one routinely offered by
lay people when confronted with this question:
that the theatre owner just takes advantage of
his monopoly on the popcorn market within the
theater. But theatre owners are lay people, and
there seems nothing fantastic about them doing
it for the same – erroneous – reason as other
people assume owners to behave like that.
3.2 9-pricing
One of the price strategies that still attracts
some attention among economists is the
practice of charging prices ending in 9: $5.99
instead of $6.00, $79 instead of $80 or similar.
(While this riddle also appears in Landsburg’s
popular book [10, pp. 10–19], it was inaugu-
rated in the hall of riddles as early as 1936 [7].
Anecdotally, such practice is supposed to have
originated with a Czech shoe producer Tomá‰
BaÈa. This may have been local invention or
introduction, but, generally, these “just-below
prices” first appeared in 19th century after the
invention of a cash register.) Higher frequency
of 9’s at the end of prices is surely suspect in
a world of conventional rational pricing models.
What then could, according to some econo-
mists, make businesses choose this pattern of
pricing over more conventional – and in rational
terms explainable – pricing strategies? One
reason, presented by Landsburg, is an
elimination of the agency problem: employees
are less likely not to register sales if the price is
such as to require giving change back to the
customer [10, pp. 15–16]. Other authors
speculate e.g. about quality signaling properties
of the 9-ending versus 0-ending prices [16].
The reason for economists being puzzled
here is their unwillingness to accept the man-
on-the-street explanation: that 9-ending prices
are perceived by consumers as lower than they
really are, which is why they buy substantially
higher quantities. While it is surely surprising
and hard to square with plain rationality that
people would routinely zero in on the numbers
to the left from the 9 and round the price
downward, we should not lose sight of the fact
that customers are men-on-the-street. And if
this is what consumers do, they may indeed be
doing it for precisely this unbelievable reason.
(In fact, studies of consumer choice admit both
the possibility of this behavior on the part of
consumers [14], and the possibility of illusion
on the part of businesses about the extent to
which consumers indeed behave that way, thus
indicating an error on the business side [2].)
3.3 Ticket Underpricing
Perhaps the most compelling and important of
all riddles are instances of sub-equilibrium
prices implying shortages and queues on some
markets. This purposeful non-price rationing
takes place for instance in selling admission
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tickets. Why do theater owners, concert
producers and others charge sometimes so
little despite the fact that there is an excess
demand and it seems they could increase the
price without selling less and thus increase
their profits? Here is what economists submit
as general solutions to the seller-induced
excess demand puzzle.
Perhaps most simply, there is a conjecture
that consumers may perceive a certain limit of
the price beyond which they would consider the
price “unfair” [8]. Sellers may then be afraid of
crossing such threshold, and choose to live
with the queues.
Or, it has been proposed that creating an
excess demand may cause a “buying frenzy”
with consumers being driven to purchase
sooner than they otherwise would. This means
that consumers make less informed purchasing
decisions and that the producer can charge
higher price to people who would normally
postpone their purchase to become more
informed [5].
Further, it has been asserted that, in some
cases, inducing an excess demand may be
a way to influence the composition of the
audience. As the existence of complementary
goods to attending an event varies across the
audience, the seller may find it profitable to
trade off lower receipts from the box office for
higher sales of complementary goods (CD’s,
videos, T-shirts and other paraphernalia).
Provided the attendees who tend to buy more
complementary goods than others are those
who are also willing to incur extra cost of
getting hold of the tickets (standing in line,
buying from scalpers etc.), selling at lower-
than-market-clearing price may be a profitable
strategy. (This argument is attributed to
Kenneth McLaughlin [10, p. 13].)
Finally, and perhaps most convolutedly, it is
suggested that in case of some goods, the
individual demand is dependent on the total
quantity demanded on the market. This is said
to lead to a possibility of an upward sloping
demand (within certain quantities) and a profit-
maximizing equilibrium at a price that
generates excess demand. Such equilibrium is
unstable, however, and may be upset by a price
hike. In such case, the reduction of quantity
demanded might cause the individual demands
to falter and the market to revert to a standard
equilibrium at both lower price and lower
quantity and, consequently, lower the level of
profit [3].
An implicit assumption behind all these
rationalizations is that, surely, the sellers have
good, profit-maximizing reasons not to raise
prices, not as the conventional wisdom would
have it: that lines are a consequence of the
product to be of limited availability. But would it
be impossible for the ticket sellers to share
such conventional wisdom?
4. Solutions Tested
Some of the above explanations may have their
merits and presumably may be applicable as
solutions to the particular riddles, even if on
a limited scale: fairness constraints relate
mostly to situations of price gouging; buying
frenzies are restricted to new products;
complementary goods may be important in
case of some concerts or sports games, but are
hardly present everywhere where there are
lines. Many of them, however, are based on
such complex economic reasoning that there
seems to be some grounds for doubting their
real-world plausibility. It would be fair then to
put these solutions to test, particularly if the test
is easier than it seems – all that needs to be
done to solve these mysteries once and for all
is to go and ask the people whose behavior
economists speculate about.
Now, surprisingly, this is not happening.
Economists keep trying to construct theoretical
explanations, but nobody seems to have gone
to movie theater owners to ask them to what
degree they consider their customers different
and what they thought of the correlation
between willingness to pay for seeing movies
and consumption of popcorn. Has someone
asked the sellers what they signal with the “just-
below” prices they charge? Has anybody gone
to the Becker’s Palo Alto sea food restaurant
and confirmed that the owner indeed assumes
the individual quantity of his products
demanded depends on the aggregate quantity
demanded? (There were studies asking the
sellers whether they charge such prices, but,
astonishingly, not why. In fact, Stiving starts by
citing a multitude of studies from 1954 till 1997
that establish the fact that such prices are
indeed charged by asking the company
managers [16, p. 1618], and then spends his
whole article on hypothesizing when and why
they do so. Landsburg, on the other hand,
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suggests to test his idea about agency problem
by testing the hypothesis that “99-cent pricing
should be less common in stores where the
owners work the cash register” [10, p. 16].)
In order to close this empirical void, we focused
on the problem of ticket underpricing, and
interviewed head managers of three performance
theaters in Prague. All of the theatres are
infamous for lines at their box offices, ranging
from single hours to overnight waiting time. We
asked all of them about the causes of the lines,
about the influence of price on their profit and
reasons for not increasing the price.
The survey was conducted in November
and December 2007 as interviews in person
(with one exception). Besides three theatres it
included other businesses as well: 2 restaurants,
2 hair studios, 1 ice-hockey club and 1 concert
producer (interviewed over phone). The common
denominator of all the non-theatre cases was
that the lines seemed to be a product of
imperfect foresight and risk aversion and would
thus not be classed as rational riddles. For this
reason I do not reproduce the interviews here
and limit myself to theatres only.
4.1 Theatre A
In the first theatre (A), the management
perceives lines as a problem and repeatedly it
tries to address them. In fact, the head
manager admitted that had she been a regular
theatre visitor, she would have never attended
any of the performances there as she hated
standing in lines (emphasis added).
The answer to a straightforward question
about the causes of lines was, unwaveringly,
that the number of seats is too small to
accommodate all the people who would like to
come. The way they have dealt with the lines
was to a) keep their box office as the only ticket
distribution channel, and b) limit the number of
tickets an individual is allowed to purchase to 4.
Both a) and b) were designed to prevent
second-hand dealings with purchased tickets,
which was expected to make sure “the
performance would be attended by as many
people who want to come as possible”. As this
number can hardly change due to the fixed
number of seats, she might have possibly
meant that the audience composition would be
affected by the price. Indeed, later in the
interview she briefly mentions they “are not
interested in snobbish audience.”
Only when explicitly cued, the head
manager reluctantly admitted the possible role
of ticket prices but pointed out immediately that
people could not afford it then. She commended
the fact people had never complained about
prices and thought that raising the ticket prices
would force their customers to limit the number
of tickets they buy in their lifetime. And this, as
she emphasized, was not the goal of the
theater.
4.2 Theatre B
In the second theater (B), too, the manager has
a “simple” explanation for the lines: the number
of people interested in coming is greater than
the theater capacity and “people have to,
naturally, come ahead of time”. He thought this
system is just but restrictive at the same time
as it relies on limits on purchases and does not
allow reservations, which, he admitted, is
particularly vexing for people outside of
Prague. They are not aware of, and thus are
not concerned about, second hand dealings
with tickets. When asked what they would do if
they knew it was happening, the head manager
pointed to possible way of increasing the
transparency such as “informing the people
about the number of tickets”.
The question of ticket prices had to be
brought up explicitly by the interviewer. The
answer was uncertain, indicative of no prior
consideration and of confusion between all
possible effects. Prices, on the one hand, he
asserted, “would have no effect on the number
of people who buy the tickets”. This should not
be too surprising as the number of seats is
fixed. What he probably meant was that the
quantity demanded (the number of people who
want to buy) would not be affected.) Even if
they had an effect, he went on, people would
resent seeing prices increased. On the other
hand, almost immediately, he added there
might be some room for price increases. At the
end, the low prices (and the lines) were
rationalized as a means for securing a “grass-
root” composition of the audience.
4.3 Theatre C
Lastly, the interview with the operations director
of the third theater (C) had almost an identical
plot. She claimed they have lines because
people like what they do and their auditorium
space is limited. When maneuvered to the
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possible role of prices, she thought it was of
secondary importance. On the other hand, she
revealed that they had increased their prices
and do so every year, and admitted they try to
reflect the demand for their performances. On
yet another hand, though, she added that the
price increases were necessary due to the
operation cost and that the growing demand
was something that enabled them to pass the
cost to the audience, more than being
a motivation for price increases. Finally, she
contradicted this by admitting that e.g. before
Christmas they offer gift tickets at higher prices
and charge higher prices for performances
notorious for the lines. She noted that the lines
have been reduced by “almost a half” of their
previous lengths, and attributes this mainly to
the price increases, possibly supported by
a system of internet reservations.
It would be wholly improper to consider this
micro-survey as robustly exploding the whole
riddle-solution-research program. Its results
are, however, still of interest as they do not
exactly paint a picture of the theatre manage-
ment doing something even remotely as
sophisticated as the economic theorists suggest.
And it is not the lack of rigorous economic
thinking on the part of the theater managers
and their failure to use the very language and
concepts of professional economists. It is that
the interviews reveal precisely the type of
economic thinking economists rule out before
they start their thinking about the problem,
which is why they not only end up, but already
start working in, a different world.
No respondents on their own even linked
the existence of lines with the prices, much less
with prices being “too low”. Instead, all of them
thought it had to with scarcity, as if other things
in the world besides theater tickets were not
scarce. Even when prompted about the prices,
the immediate reaction was – with the possible
exception of C – that this would not work
because people would not be able to afford it,
as if the low price made the tickets somehow
generally more available. (Given the fact that
theater C showed substantially less puzzling
behavior – they do adjust prices according to
demand, and effectively manage to shorten
their lines – it may be of interest to mention that
the manager of C was a university graduate
with some economic education. The other
managers (those of A and B) were non-
business, arts educated persons. This would
coincide with findings cited by Bryan Caplan on
the – quite unsurprising – negative correlation
between economic education and the level of
biases about economics [4, pp. 50–93]).
Some of the other responses seduce one to
rational interpretation: e.g. the idea that people
would resent price increases may sound like
Kahneman et al. and their concept of fairness
constraint [8]. Or, the influence of price on the
audience composition rings a somewhat
rational bell. However, neither of these is
a sufficient reason for not raising the prices and
both are much more likely to be relevant under
alternative – non-profit-maximization – schemes.
(The theater managers may know that buyers
will resent the price hikes, and still it may be
more profitable to do so. Similarly, even if the
theater managers and ensemble prefer the sort
of audience made of people who can put up
with standing in the line overnight, but still it
may be more profitable to have higher prices
and “worse” audience. In these situations, their
decision not to raise prices will then be
economic only as long as their utility functions
include feel-good arguments such as public
approval, or fond relations with the audience.)
As will be recalled, however, the economists’
solutions to riddles are provided as rationaliza-
tions of lines under profit-maximization
assumption – otherwise the explanations would
be considered as trivial imputation of behavior
(means) right into the goals (ends). Either way,
truly sophisticated solutions like the one offered
by Becker [3] seem somewhat irrelevant in the
context of the business thinking the interviews
attempt to document. Unless, of course, one is
to argue that the managers did not want to
disclose their real strategies, and just “played
stupid” instead. Unlikely as it is, it brings me
finally to the economics of being stupid.
5. When the Stupid Comes In
We have seen above that there is in fact an
easy way to test the empirical relevance of
economists’ solution to rational riddles: by
asking the very people whose motives they
have tried to second-guess. We also saw that
such surveys are unbelievably rare if not non-
existent. But even if these surveys were
undertaken, they would at best produce a logic
that was already known and practiced, even if
not formally described on pages of an
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economic journal. That might not be exactly the
best use of economists’ intellectual capacity,
but at least it would prove the empirical power
of the discipline (and, presumably, made some
economists prouder of themselves).
When, on the other hand, the solutions proposed
by economists are found empirically irrelevant,
it may only mean one of the following: a) no
economists correctly guessed what businesses
are up to (the game may proceed), or b) no such
further solution exists as the puzzling behavior is
indeed and simply a product of irrational thinking
the economists refused to accept in the first
place. Its triviality notwithstanding, this eventuality
may be empirically very relevant and important.
If economists choose to banish the
possibility of irrationality, their understanding of
what is going on is impaired. What looks like an
outwitting game with no social consequence is
just a tip of the iceberg – the economists’
determination to insist on rationality may create
imaginary puzzles where there are none and
thus divert their scarce intellectual resources
from areas where they are more needed.
One area that was hit particularly hard by
resistance to irrationality is the economics of
policy-making. Bryan Caplan’s book, compiling
and wrapping up his research project of the
past decade or so [4], shows quite convincingly
that attempts to explain persistence of foolish
public have systematically shunned the
possibility of the electorate being mistaken in
understating the impact of the policies. Political
process, perverted as it may be, does not
explain away all the public policy foolishness. If
democracy produced policy that people really
liked, it would have been even more foolish
than it is. Caplan points out how much the
ideas of the public are systematically biased
compared to what economists think. Indeed,
my findings in the theater survey – the lack of
appreciation of the role of prices – tallies
directly with the biases he was able to identify.
He thus shows that the folly of the electorate
may be the missing piece in the puzzle. That
the attempts of standard public choice theory to
account for persistence of bad policies have
been failing and have produced convoluted and
useless theoretical work precisely because
economists in the past century – unlike some of
the century before that – turned a blind eye to
the possibility of human folly. As Caplan
concludes his book:
Social science has pursued many blind
alleys – and ignored many promising ones –
out of misguided insistence that every model be
a “story without fools,” even in areas like
politics where folly is central. A proverb tells us
that “a wise man learns more from a fool than
a fool learns from a wise man.” By closing their
eyes to fools and folly, the wise men of social
science have artificially hobbled the advance of
their own learning. [4, p. 209]
Conclusion
The purpose of this article was two-fold.
First, I wanted to bring attention to two strange
features of economists’ research program. When
economists speculate about why people’s
behavior is rational (which is what they do when
cracking the rational riddles), the result of such
scientific effort – all its sophistication,
ingeniousness and formal impeccability
notwithstanding – is either correct, but not new
(i.e. it has been known before to the examined
people), or simply wrong in the sense that the
solution does not apply (i.e. it is empirically
empty). Either way, the significance of such
science seems compelling bit limited. Moreover,
this is just as strange as the way through which
economists typically try to test the empirical
validity of their results. Testing hypotheses
implied by the results can, of course, shed
much light on that question, but since their
results relate essentially to a question of why
people do what they do, it is the examined
people who can settle the issue. While data can
talk, so can the people.
Second, I suggest economists may be
somewhat uneconomical in their research
efforts. By insisting on models with rational
actors only, they may embark on a vacuous
rational riddles research project in the first
place. And through their isolation from the
people they examine, they fail to find out that in
many cases the rational riddle solution does not
exist, and that the behavior they speculate
about is a product of confusion and folly, that it
is simply irrational.
This is in no way a plea for discarding the
rationality assumption in economics. It is only
a plea for remembering that it is an assumption
that may just as well not be met. By heeding it,
economists can economize on their scarce
research resources, and perhaps devote more
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of them to, and do an even better job in, areas
where such assumption holds.
The author would like to thank Josef
Montag for comments and administrating and
processing the micro survey, and to David
Lipka and Ed Stringham for valuable comments
on previous versions of the text. Others
I choose to leave unmentioned lest someone is
left out. The usual caveat applies.
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Abstract
THE ECONOMICS OF BEING STUPID: A NOTE ON (IR)RATIONALITY 
IN ECONOMICS
Dan ·Èastn˘
Economists’ habit of imputing rational motives to all human behavior gives rise to ‘rational riddles’:
rational explanations for seemingly irrational behavior. In the article I argue that economists’
solutions to these riddles are, despite their sophistication, of limited scientific value as they
describe mechanisms that are never both new and correct: they may be empirically correct but not
new as these mechanisms have been practiced (hence known) by some people before; or they are
genuinely new (previously unknown to anybody), but empirically wrong as they fail to account for
the real reasons of observed behavior. I further show that the hypothesized solutions to the riddles
could be easily tested by consulting the people whose behavior is examined, and point to the
strange lack of economists' efforts to do so. Finally I present results of a micro survey relating to
one such rational riddle: ticket underpricing (why prices of tickets for various events do not adjust
to eliminate the excess demand). By interviewing managers of theatres known to sell tickets at
prices that create lines, I present some evidence showing that it is much easier to explain the
observed behavior in terms of plain ignorance of some elementary economic principles or facts
rather than in terms of some economic sophistication on the part of the managers. No interviewees,
for example, explicitly related the existence of lines to ticket underpricing, and some actually denied
any link there even if prompted. I conclude by pointing to the real cost to the economic profession
stemming from its decision to ignore the possibility of irrationality in economists' research program.
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